New Research on Ukraine: Politics, Society, War

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The Petrach Program on Ukraine specializes in researching contemporary Ukrainian politics, society, and culture. It was created in 1996 with the Petrach Endowment for Ukrainian Studies and experienced tremendous growth with the creation of the Elliott School Fund for Scholars Affected by the War in Ukraine, launched in Spring 2022 as an answer to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Today, the Petrach Program offers multiple opportunities for research on Ukraine and for Ukrainian scholars to study contemporary Ukraine and its place on the international scene.

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The War and Beyond: Ukraine's Political, Civic, and Geopolitical Evolution

Uliana Movchan[1]

The Petrach Annual Online Conference, held in the spring of 2024, brought together an esteemed cohort of Ukraine Studies fellows, both resident, and non-resident, alongside prominent North America-based scholars, to explore pivotal topics concerning Ukrainian politics and Ukraine's role in international affairs. This year's event underscored the profound challenges and opportunities faced by Ukraine in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape, emphasizing themes such as governance, civic engagement, European integration, and the impact of war on societal structures. These proceedings capture the depth and diversity of the discussions, offering a series of thought-provoking papers that explore these critical issues.

Myroslava Lendel's paper, *Civic and Political Values of Residents of the Slovak and Ukrainian Borderlands Before and During the Russian Invasion of Ukraine*, investigates the influence of Europeanization on the civic and political values of residents in the border regions of Slovakia and Ukraine. Through a survey of experts, the study examines how decentralization and European integration shape political attitudes and participation, revealing the opportunities and challenges of fostering greater civic engagement across these regions.

Vitaliy Lytvyn's contribution, *Can Political Transition Be Never-Ending? The Context of Inter-Institutional and Political Relations in Ukraine,* examines Ukraine's prolonged political transition and its implications for European integration. Highlighting the volatility of inter-institutional relations and the hybrid nature of Ukraine's political regime, the paper advocates for reforms aimed at stabilizing governance through a democratization-focused framework and a shift toward parliamentary democracy.

Viktor Stepanenko's paper, *Responsible Citizenship as a Practice and Discourse in Wartime Ukraine*, explores the multifaceted concept of responsible citizenship in the context of war. It examines civic engagement, mutual support, and solidarity as critical factors in Ukraine's wartime resilience and post-war prospects. The study underscores the potential of responsible citizens to counterbalance authoritarian risks, highlighting the need for fostering civic responsibility amidst populistic and paternalistic tendencies.

Olena Bordilovska's paper, *The Rise of the Global South: The Factor of the Russia-Ukraine War*, delves into the geopolitical ramifications of the Russia-Ukraine war on the Global South. The research explores how the conflict has amplified the voice of non-Western nations, emphasizing their growing influence in international forums and the implications for global diplomacy and Ukraine's outreach to these nations.

Iryna Baltaziuk's paper, *The Impact of the Socio-Political Environment on Ukrainian Art after the 24th of February 2022*, explores how Russia's war against Ukraine has reshaped Ukrainian art into a powerful political and cultural force. The research focuses on the evolving role of art in reinforcing national identity, countering propaganda, and promoting cultural diplomacy. By documenting a diverse range of artistic expressions, Baltaziuk illustrates how artists convey collective resilience and contribute to Ukraine's global presence through symbolic and creative means.

Yuriy Zaliznyak's analysis, *The Cognitive Warfare Challenge for Media Standards of War Coverage in Ukraine*, addresses the complexities of cognitive warfare and its impact on media standards during conflict. The paper investigates how modern media practices can be exploited by cognitive warfare actors, urging a reassessment of journalistic standards to safeguard against manipulation while maintaining ethical reporting.

Igor Lyman's study, *Human and Material Dimensions of Losses of Ukrainian Science in Russia's War Against Ukraine*, explores the devastating impact of Russia's aggression on Ukrainian science. Focusing on both human and material losses, the paper examines key initiatives such as the Ukrainian Science Diaspora and Science at Risk. Lyman highlights the efforts to assess and mitigate the damage to research infrastructure and the academic community while stressing the ongoing challenges and the urgent need for restoration and support for the Ukrainian scientific diaspora.

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Together, these contributions offer a comprehensive examination of Ukraine's challenges and transformations amidst war and global change. The insights presented here serve not only as an indication of the resilience of Ukrainian society and scholarship but also as a foundation for ongoing dialogue and collaboration in addressing the pressing issues of the present time.

Civic and Political Values of Residents of the Slovak and Ukrainian Borderlands Before and During the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Myroslava Lendel[2]

The COVID-19 pandemic, Russian invasion of Ukraine, humanitarian crises, geopolitical dynamics, and economic setbacks have made social cohesion an increasingly pressing challenge for the European Union today. Ukraine demonstrated an intensified commitment towards its European integration goal during the last years, prompted by existential challenges caused by Russian aggression. This paradox encourages more investigation into the civil society of Ukraine and the Central European countries impacted by the neighboring state's political and social processes.

The border regions of the Slovak Republic (*Košice and Prešov region*) and Ukraine (*Zakarpattia region*) were chosen as the cases for the political culture study because, in contrast to the situation on the Hungarian-Ukrainian border or other phantom ethnopolitical border lines in Central Europe, this area does not involve significant ethnic conflicts, nor does it affect the historical trauma of belonging to a subordinate or dominant nation.

During the last few years, political scientists and sociologists have argued that there have been changes in the value orientations of Europeans. Specifically, Ronald Inglehart's theory emphasizes the emergence of post-material political culture. The defining attributes of this phenomenon include diminishing regard for the leaders, heightened political engagement, a shift from political parties to independent entities, familiarity with innovative forms of political action, a gradual decrease in ideological political disputes, a focus on cultural affairs, and an overall improvement in quality of life. However, cultural and historical contexts impact citizens' political attitudes and behavior (Inglehart, Welzel, 2010).

It is important to note that external factors, particularly transnational ones, can also impact citizens' cultural orientations. Among these factors, Europeanization holds significant importance. The theory of Europeanization is viewed as the process of developing, institutionalizing, and disseminating formal and informal rules, practices, political paradigms, styles of political behavior, and shared ideals and values that were initially developed within the EU institutions and then added to the national political environment (Radelli, 2000).

The past two decades have witnessed the publication of many research articles examining the evolution of the Slovak-Ukrainian borderlands. In addition to the economic, social, energy, and spatial dimensions of collaboration, the influence of the EU on political cooperation between the *Košice and Prešov regions* in Slovakia and the *Zakarpattia region* in Ukraine has been examined (Benc, 2015; Lačný, 2021). In particular, the legal foundations of cross-border cooperation between regional and local governments, the impact of European integration on decentralization of power, and the cases of *Košice, Prešov and Zakarpattia regions* where cooperation is most or least effective have all been the focus of extensive study (Duleba, Lendel, Oravcova, 2023; Lacny, Polackova, Cirner, Szekely, 2022; Lendel, 2021). The distinct research aimed to develop regional and local political elites in Slovakia from the onset of democratization until the mid-2000s (Lendel, 2014). Despite numerous studies examining the sociopolitical and spatial development of the border regions between Ukraine and Slovakia, there is still a lack of research investigating the relationship between cultural and historical factors, European policy frameworks, and the political attitudes of citizens living in these areas.

Research Questions and Methodology

Considering the state of the art and play, this study aims to determine the influence of Europeanization on the civic and political values of the inhabitants of the Slovak-Ukrainian border

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before and at the initial stage of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. There are prerequisites for the hypothesis that local, historically established factors that still affect citizens' political attitudes and actions as we enter the twenty-first century have started to interact with the impact of Europeanization.

Inglehart's theory on post-material political culture was already mentioned in the criteria for evaluating the fundamental components of political culture in the border regions. In accordance with the aforementioned approach, it is imperative for citizens' political orientations and behaviors to adhere to specific criteria, which are the following:

- Engagement in regional development and deliberation of specific political interests with regional elites.
- Participation in elections.
- Engaging in communication with regional elite's representatives.

To achieve the defined aim of finding the impact of local/regional factors and Europeanization on the political culture of the citizens residing near the Slovak-Ukrainian border, a Delphi Method survey was conducted from January to October of 2022. Eight experts, distinguished by their research expertise and experience in public policy, participated in the survey conducted for this study. Among them, four experts hail from the *Košice and Prešov regions* of the Slovak Republic, while the remaining four experts originate from the *Zakarpattia region* of Ukraine.

The following research questions were developed to achieve the aforementioned goals:

RO1. How do Slovak and Ukrainian experts assess the impact of decentralization on citizens' perceptions of public policy in border regions of Slovakia and Ukraine?

RQ 2: Do academics and public policy experts believe that the Europeanization of policymaking influences citizens' political behavior in neighboring regions?

Additional data collected in the latter half of 2022 or 2023 are also being considered, as long as it does not contain any inconsistencies with the earlier opinions of experts. In addition to their assessment, we used open statistical data. Specifically, we have to discuss the level of turnout during regional elections in Slovakia and Ukraine (SME Vol'by, 2022a; SME Vol'by, 2022b; Mitsevi Vybory, 2020.), the level of European integration support in Ukrainian society (Ratinggroup.ua, 2023).

Present Results and Discussion

The historical development of Eastern Slovakia and the neighboring region of Zakarpattia in Ukraine impacts the political orientations of its citizens. This influence is consistent with the principles of the path-dependency concept, which contributes to the distinctive characteristics observed in this area. Nation's self-awareness, which has experienced transformations under different governmental and political systems in the last century and is still evolving, is closely connected to political participation. It has impacted both individuals' perceptions of politics and the unwritten framework of political participation and perception, which consists of traditional social norms (Rady, 2023).

As previously stated, Europeanization entails adopting crucial EU policies within the domestic contexts of member states and candidate countries. The democratic standards of regional strategy development are included in the regional (cohesion) policy, one of these European policies. A question about Slovak and Ukrainian citizens' involvement in regional development policies was posed to the experts participating in the Delphi Method survey.

"Graph n.1: Experts' assessment of Slovak-Ukrainian borderland citizens' participation in the regional development policies"


The evaluation of the responses of Ukrainian experts focused on the level of citizen participation in developing regional policies in the *Zakarpattia region* is slightly higher. The decentralization commenced in Ukraine in 2015 and is reported to influence citizen political participation positively. Because the decentralization reform was almost complete when the Russian-Ukrainian war started, there were fewer potential negative effects, giving experts more reason to make an optimistic assessment.

In addition to the various opportunities available, Slovak experts have expressed dissatisfaction with citizen engagement in the political affairs of *Prešov and Košice* regions. The main barriers to citizens' involvement in formulating regional development strategies were indicated as follows: insufficient expertise in long-term planning, lack of enthusiasm by regional governments to inform the public and involve citizens in formulating strategies, and inadequate human resources.

Regardless of the average participation indicators, three Slovak and all Ukrainian experts indicated that political participation varies in the core and the periphery of the border regions because people in cities are more engaged in discussing public issues than those in rural areas.

An important aspect of regional development is that citizens in post-material societies can engage in cross-border cooperation with communities and regions of neighboring countries. According to the experts, elites and the general public in the Slovak-Ukrainian borderland continue to have low levels of awareness regarding the possibility of using EU funds as a tool for regional development.

Graph n.2: Experts' assessment of Slovak-Ukrainian borderland citizens` awareness concerning regional development projects

Based on the synthesis of responses from Slovak experts, residents of the *Presov and Kosice* regions show a comparatively limited degree of engagement in cross-border cooperation with the *Zakarpattia* region of Ukraine. The insufficient distribution of information concerning these initiatives by elites is the root cause of this situation. Two experts emphasized that the public's knowledge about regional development is significantly elevated solely during pre-election campaigns. The reason for this can be attributed to the establishment of effective communication channels between voters and candidates vying for council positions. Voters can select the politician whose approach to regional development aligns with their own.

Experts also assessed the reasons behind the increase in electoral engagement in 2022 among residents residing in border regions and the level of trust that citizens have in regional politicians. These values are by Inglehart's theory's second and third criteria.

In October of 2022, Slovakia held its first-ever combined regional and local elections, choosing council representatives, mayors, and leaders of districts and regions. According to the statement of Slovak experts, such unification contributed to a rise in the number of voters, as also demonstrated by official statistics.

Graph n.3: Voters' turnout during regional elections in Košice and Prešov self-governing regions, Slovak Republic

In light of the outcomes of the regional council elections in *Košice and Prešov,* it is crucial to take note of a trend that became apparent during this campaign. Most of the deputies elected to regional councils have declared themselves independent candidates. Concerning regions, *Prešov* has 27 out of 65 deputies, while *Košice* has 22 independents from a total of 57 (SME Vol'by 2022a, 2022b). The growing trend of electing independent candidates indicates confidence in individual politicians rather than parties.

To analyze political culture in the borderlands, it is crucial to analyze voter participation in regional elections within the *Zakarpattia* from 2010 to 2020. The synthesis of the evaluations made by Ukrainian experts provides explanations of the levels of voter electoral engagement and the degree of trust placed in the regional elite

When we examine the participation level in elections in *Zakarpattia*, we can observe a trend of waning public interest in political life that started in 2010. During the regional elections in 2020, which coincided with local elections in Ukraine, this pattern was noticeable in *Zakarpatia* and across the entire Ukraine.

Graph n.4: Voters` turnout during regional elections in Zakarpattia region Ukraine

According to Ukrainian experts, the 2020 elections in *Zakarpattia* reflected the conservative beliefs of the voters and their indifferent stance towards elections in general. The primary determinant of election outcomes was a lack of confidence in the ability of alternative candidates to bring about positive change in the region.

Ukrainian experts have negative opinions of how much the locals trust the political elites, particularly compared to Slovakia's regions. These arguments have been organized and categorized into a compilation of local cultural factors: nepotism in the region, the regional government's incompetence, and residents' disappointment stemming from unfulfilled election-related promises.

Conclusions

This study examines the impact of Europeanization on the political attitudes of residents along the Slovak-Ukrainian border (*Košice, Prešov,* and *Zakarpattia*) before and during the early phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, based on a Delphi survey of experts.

Experts agree that residents recognize increased authority in regional governments due to Europeanization but view this development differently. While citizens expect elected authorities to keep them informed about regional policies, Slovak experts noted a lack of enthusiasm from regional elites to involve the public despite existing opportunities for political participation.

All experts noted a difference in public perception of regional policy between urban and rural areas. Despite conservative cultural influences that may hinder political participation, EU membership or accession trajectories affect citizens' political orientations. Increasingly, local politicians communicate with residents about development issues, becoming a key aspect of election campaigns. The growth of citizen engagement through NGOs reflects a continued distrust in politicians and aligns with patterns in other EU member states, contributing to the Europeanization process.

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Can Political Transition Be Never-Ending?
The Context of Inter-Institutional and Political Relations in Ukraine

Vitaliy S. Lytvyn[3]

The political process and inter-institutional relations are dynamics influenced by various national and international factors. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, significantly impacted Ukraine's political regime and simultaneously advanced its European integration, with the country receiving EU candidate status during the war. Therefore, Ukraine must consider the experiences of neighboring Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that became EU member states earlier. While those CEE countries which are now EU member states are considered to have completed their political transition and become consolidated democracies, Ukraine has experienced ongoing political instability since the end of the Cold War. Its political regime has been characterized by significant volatility, often described as a hybrid system incorporating elements of both democratic and autocratic approaches. The instability of inter-institutional relations and systems of government frequently contribute to these fluctuations. Thus, the complexity and incompleteness of Ukraine's political transition make its path to European integration more challenging. This raises a fundamental question: Can political transition be an ongoing (that is, never-ending) process, or must it have a definitive endpoint? Consequently, this paper explores the dynamics of Ukraine's political transition, focusing on the intricate relationship between the political regime and system of government.

Completeness or Incompleteness of Political Transition: State of the Art and Theoretical/Empirical Framework

Political transitions are a complex area of research, characterized by scholarly debates about their nature and course (Linz and Stepan 1996). Contemporary understandings challenge traditional linear models of democratization and suggest a nuanced, nonlinear process with multiple potential outcomes (Collier and Levitsky 1997; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). While early approaches viewed transition as a straightforward movement from autocratic to democratic regimes (Huntington 1991), recent scholarship emphasizes the process' complexity. Researchers recognize that political transitions are neither predetermined nor progressive, with countries potentially experiencing democratic consolidation followed by deconsolidation (Bermeo 2016; Foa and Mounk 2016).

Empirical evidence from CEE countries provides a compelling framework. Freedom House data shows that successfully transitioned countries can experience democratic backsliding. Countries like Hungary and Poland illustrate how consolidated democracies can witness significant regression, challenging the assumption of a completed transition (Grzymala-Busse 2017). Thus, key features of contemporary research include the rejection of linear models of transition (Zakaria 1997), the recognition of the dynamic nature of political systems (Schedler 1998), the acknowledgement of democratic "erosion" (Chull Shin 2021), and the emphasis on contextual factors (D'Anieri 2015). Empirical evidence also suggests that political transitions are characterized by ongoing negotiations between democratic and nondemocratic practices, the potential for progress and regression, variation across national contexts, and the influence of internal and external political dynamics.

The initial overview of democratic consolidation in the CEE countries has evolved into an analysis of partial deterioration, including deconsolidation, which brings us back to the concept of uncompleted, or never-ending, political transition. The term "never-ending" raises critical questions when examined through transitological and institutional paradigm perspectives. From one perspective, "never-ending" describes the continuous, challenging process of establishing democratic institutions and practices over time. Alternatively, it highlights how this ongoing transition can be hindered by non-democratic or less-democratic ruling elites (Bakke and Sitter 2022; Berend and Bugarič 2015; Gora and de Wilde 2020). Within these paradigms, transition is understood not merely as a movement from autocracy to democracy, but as a broader interval

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process of transitioning between political regimes, including shifts within the same regime's subtypes. This process fundamentally involves rejecting past regimes and constructing new rule configurations, recognizing that countries can experience oscillations between different regime options or dynamics.

Thus, the study focuses on understanding political transition as a potentially never-ending process. Examining Ukraine's transition in the CEE context aims to deconstruct traditional paradigms and offer a nuanced interpretation of political regime transformations. Methodologically, this research integrates several approaches, including comparative analysis of Freedom House democratic indicators and institutional design features. This approach provides a comprehensive understanding that goes beyond simplistic categorizations. By challenging the notion of a completed political transition, this research contributes to a more nuanced understanding of nonlinear political regime change and highlights the need for dynamic, context-sensitive analytical frameworks.

Political Transition as a Nonlinear Process: The Relationship between the Political Regime and System of Government in Ukraine

Ukraine's political landscape since 1991 shows dynamic regime transformations, as documented by Freedom House. Initially rated as "partly free" (3.5/7; a score of 1 is best) during the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk (1991–1994) and Leonid Kuchma's first presidential administration (1994–1999), the regime experienced its worst phase (4/7) during Kuchma's second term (2000–2004). The 2004 Orange Revolution briefly improved freedoms under Viktor Yushchenko (2005–2010) to 2.5/7, or "free" status, but this progress was short-lived. Under Viktor Yanukovych (2010–2013), Ukraine became more authoritarian, with declining rights and liberties (3.5/7, or "partly free" status). The 2013–2014 Euromaidan, Revolution of Dignity, Crimea's annexation by Russia, and Russia's Donbas region occupation marked significant political shifts. Despite these challenges and ongoing war, democracy remained stable at a 3/7 level under Petro Poroshenko (2014–2019) and Volodymyr Zelensky (since 2019) until early 2022. The 2022 full-scale Russo-Ukrainian War negatively impacted democratic indicators, dropping Ukraine's score to 4/7. Throughout its post-independence history, Ukraine has remained either a hybrid regime or an electoral democracy, with "revolutions" being the primary catalysts for political transformation, demonstrating ongoing democratic complexity and resilience.

As a result, the level of democracy in Ukraine has increased in some cases and decreased in others due to the resurgence of autocracy. While there have been positive developments in Ukraine's transition to democracy, the country still faces significant challenges in consolidating democratic institutions, ensuring the rule of law, and even partial re-autocratization. This underscores a kind of never-ending transition of the political regime. At the same time, it prompts a search for the reasons behind it, including institutional factors (Hale 2015; Terzyan 2020; Turchyn et al. 2020). The political regime in Ukraine can be broadly described as hybrid throughout its history since 1991. In my opinion, characterizing Ukraine's regime as hybrid is not entirely accurate, as a hybrid regime's nature is dynamic and subject to fluctuations, ranging from more to less democratic/autocratic options and vice versa (Figure 1).

Various factors shape a country's political regime and transition, including political, administrative, electoral participation rates, human rights, corruption levels, and socio-economic indicators. A more fundamental and systemic aspect emerges from defining political regimes as means of acquiring and exercising power. The inter-institutional relations between the head of state, cabinet, and parliament within a country's institutional framework crucially impact its regime (Sedelius and Berglund 2012). The system of government concept is thus relevant, referring to institutional arrangements that shape power distribution, resulting in presidential, parliamentary, semi-presidential, and even semi-parliamentary systems (Cheibub and Limongi 2002; Elgie 2004; Lijphart 1992; Shugart and Carey1992; Siaroff 2003). The presidential system features a popularly-elected, fixed-term president and a cabinet (administration) responsible to the president, not to a

parliament (such as in Brazil or the US). The parliamentary system has a parliament-elected president and a prime minister/cabinet responsible only to parliament (such as in Estonia or Germany). The semi-presidential system combines a popularly-elected, fixed-term president with a prime minister/cabinet responsible to parliament or both parliament and president (such as in France or Ukraine). The choice of the system of government, typically through constitutional adoption/amendment, is crucial for transitioning countries, as it shapes the nature of the transition and future regime.

Figure 1

The dynamics of the transition of the Ukrainian political regime (1991–2023), Freedom House scores (Freedom House 2023 and 2024)

Ukraine's case is distinctive and specific in its adoption of an incomplete semi-presidential system. Unlike other CEE countries, Ukraine delayed its constitutional adoption until 1996. Since then, it has maintained a semi-presidential republic with a popularly-elected president and a prime minister-led cabinet responsible to parliament (that is, responsible to both the president and parliament). Before 1996, a similar but poorly regulated system existed, except in 1995–1996, when Ukraine briefly adopted presidentialism, whereby the president served as both the head of state and as chief executive. Given this, the fundamental issue behind Ukraine's never-ending transition is its incomplete implementation of semi-presidentialism. The system has shifted between options, often with presidential changes (Lytvyn 2016). Semi-presidentialism it is not homogeneous, but varies significantly in its specifics (Elgie 2011; Lytvyn 2020). The main classification distinguishes president-parliamentary from premier-presidential subtypes based on cabinet dismissal powers: parliament alone in premier-presidentialism, versus both president and parliament in president-parliamentarism (Elgie 2011; Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart 2005). Thus, even constitutional changes to dismissal procedures can alter the semi-presidential format.

As shown in Table 1, Ukrainian semi-presidentialism has been cyclical and volatile. From 1991–1995, under Kravchuk and partly under Kuchma, Ukraine operated under a president-parliamentary system before its constitutional adoption, featuring cabinet dual responsibility and president-parliament balance. Following the 1996 Constitution, under Kuchma until 2005, Ukraine maintained its president-parliamentary logic with enhanced presidential powers.

The volatility of the options of semi-presidentialism in Ukraine (1991–2024)

Period	Constitutional system of government (factual logic)	Type of semi-presidentialism	President (dates in office)	Prime Minister (dates in office) (dd.mm.yyyy)	Mean level of freedom / "Freedom in the World" (lower is more democratic)
Aug.–Dec. 1991	Parliamentary (parliamentary)	–	–	Vitold Fokin (24.08.1991 – 01.10.1992)	3.0
Dec. 1991–Jun. 1995	Semi-presidential (balanced)	President-parliamentarism	Leonid Kravchuk (05.12.1991 – 19.07.1994)		3.0
				Leonid Kuchma (13.10.1992 – 21.09.1993)	4.0
				Yukhym Zvyagilskyi (22.09.1993 – 15.06.1994)	3.5
				Vitaliy Masol (16.06.1994 – 08.06.1995)	3.5
					3.5
Jun 1995–Jun. 1996	Presidential (presidential)	–	Leonid Kuchma 1, 2 (19.07.1994 – 23.01.2005)	Yevhen Marchuk (08.06.1995 – 27.05.1996)	3.5
				Pavlo Lazarenko 1 (28.05.1996 – 05.07.1996)	3.5
Jun. 1996–Jan. 2006	Semi-presidential (presidential)	President-parliamentarism		Pavlo Lazarenko 2 (11.07.1996 – 02.07.1997)	3.5
				Valeriy Pustovoytenko (16.07.1997 – 22.12.1999)	3.5
				Viktor Yushchenko (30.12.1999 – 28.04.2001)	4.0
				Anatoliy Kinakh (29.05.2001 – 16.11.2002)	4.0
				Viktor Yanukovych 1 (21.11.2002 – 05.01.2005)	3.5
			Viktor Yushchenko (23.01.2005 – 25.02.2010)	Yulia Tymoshenko 1 (04.02.2005 – 08.09.2005)	2.5
				Yuriy Yekhanurov (22.09.2005 – 04.08.2006)	2.5
Jan. 2006–Oct. 2010	Semi-presidential (balanced)	Premier-presidentialism		Viktor Yanukovych 2 (04.08.2006 – 16.10.2006)	2.5
				Viktor Yanukovych 3 (17.10.2006 – 18.12.2007)	2.5
				Yulia Tymoshenko 2 (18.12.2007 – 03.03.2010)	2.5
					3.0
Oct. 2010–Feb. 2014	Semi-presidential (presidential)	President-parliamentarism	Viktor Yanukovych (25.02.2010 – 22.02.2014)	Mykola Azarov 1 (11.03.2010 – 09.12.2010)	3.0
				Mykola Azarov 2 (09.12.2010 – 03.12.2012)	3.5
				Mykola Azarov 3 (24.12.2012 – 28.01.2014)	3.5
Feb. 2014–present	Semi-presidential (balanced)	Premier-presidentialism	Oleksandr Turchynov (acting) (23.02.2014 – 07.06.2014)	Arseniy Yatsenyuk 1 (27.02.2014 – 27.11.2014)	3.0
			Petro Poroshenko (07.06.2014 – 20.05.2019)		3.0
				Arseniy Yatsenyuk 2 (02.12.2014 – 01.09.2015)	3.0
				Arseniy Yatsenyuk 3 (01.09.2015 – 17.02.2016)	3.0
				Arseniy Yatsenyuk 4 (18.02.2016 – 14.04.2016)	3.0
				Volodymyr Groysman (14.04.2016 – 29.08.2019)	3.0
			Volodymyr Zelensky (20.05.2019 – until now)		3.5
				Oleksiy Honcharuk (29.08.2019 – 04.03.2020)	3.0
				Denys Shmyhal (04.03.2020 – until now)	4.0

Constitutional amendments in 2004, implemented in 2006–2010 under Yushchenko, moved Ukraine to a premier-presidential system with cabinet collectively responsible only to parliament, reducing presidential powers and favoring the prime minister. Yanukovych reversed this through a 2010 Constitutional Court ruling, restoring president-parliamentary semi-presidentialism with stronger or even dominant presidential authority until 2014. Following the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine returned to premier-presidential system under Poroshenko and Zelensky, operating through various parliamentary configurations. Ukraine's never-ending political regime transition thus reflects its continuous institutional transitions, as shown in Figure 2 and Table 2 through 2021 (before the wartime restrictions).

The never-ending transition story: Correlation of the hybrid regime dynamics and types of semi-presidentialism in Ukraine (1992–2021: prewar period) (Table 1; Freedom House, 2023 and 2024)

The evidence shows a clear link between Ukraine's democratization/autocratization levels and its choice of semi-presidential subtypes. The hybrid political regime during 1991–2021/2022 varied significantly. The president-parliamentary system, particularly under Kuchma and Yanukovych, led to power centralization and autocratization. This created electoral/competitive authoritarianism marked by polarization, corruption, patronage, informal influence, and weak accountability, enabling oligarchic control and institutional deadlocks (Hale 2015, 237; Levitsky and Way 2002 and 2010; Sedelius and Berglund 2012). In contrast, the premier-presidential system under Yushchenko, Poroshenko, and Zelensky has promoted decentralization and reduced power monopolies, advancing democratization according to Freedom House—characterized as electoral democracy by competitive elections, peaceful transfers of power, civil liberties, rule of law, and accountability (see averaged Table 2 scores).

Table 2

Correlation of the hybrid regime dynamics and types of semi-presidentialism in Ukraine (1992–2021: prewar period), Freedom House estimate and own averaged scores (Freedom House, 2023 and 2024)

Type of semi-presidentialism in Ukraine	Average scores of freedoms / "Freedom in the World" (lower is more democratic)
President-parliamentarism	3.53
Premier-presidentialism	2.92

Conclusions

Despite its theoretical aptness for democratization, Ukraine's political transition remains incomplete. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that completing political transitions is nearly impossible based on transitological and institutional paradigms. However, modernization or democratization paradigms offer a more realistic approach. Nevertheless, Ukraine's system of government can stabilize and complete its transition by adopting a democratization-focused framework. The main problem lies in the never-ending transition, wherein presidents have sought to dominate the executive branch, fostering autocratization and hindering democratic consolidation. Building a democratic Ukraine requires reforming its system of government, addressing the "privatization" of constitutional development and "revolution"-driven constitutional reforms. The focus should shift to strengthening the role of parliament in cabinet formation and accountability, moving toward a European model of parliamentary democracy in which parliament, not the president, leads oversight of the executive. Ukraine, like the other CEE countries, must avoid a president-parliamentary system and opt for a parliamentary or prime minister-presidential system.

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Responsible Citizenship as a Practice and Discourse in Wartime Ukraine

Viktor Stepanenko[4]

The war has extremely actualized the issues of responsible citizenship as social practice, virtue and discourse in Ukraine. This involves a wide range of aspects from civic activism, citizens' mutual support and solidarity in everyday practices to the problems of mobilization and decision-making under the war. The issues of responsible citizenship are also important in Ukraine's post-war prospects, including the country's renovation and its democratic development.

Historically, the idea of responsible citizenship could be traced to the foundations and social practice of antic Athenian democracy. Though its contemporary sounding often refers to the sociological concept of citizenship which was articulated by T. H. Marshall (Marshall, 1950). The accents on activity and responsibility in understanding modern democratic citizenship were developed by M. Mann (1987), B. S.Turner (1992, 2001), A.Touraine (2000), (Onyx, Kenny and Brown, 2011), W. Kymlicka (2012) and other researchers.

One should note that civic responsibility as a *desirable virtue* differs from civic duties which are *mandatory* rules, such as obey law, pay taxes etc. In modern democracy, citizens should be responsible (participate in voting, volunteering, be informed, be educated etc.), but there is no penalty for the lack of responsibility. In other words, active and responsible citizenship is about conscious civic *engagement and agency,* rather than formal entitlement of judicial status of citizenship in its passive form.

The research questions

Studying the issues of responsible citizenship in wartime Ukraine is a challenging research experience since, here, these issues are not only theoretical but real and practical ones for many people. The (ir-)responsible citizenship scenarios involve the broad range of choices and practices such as to leave the country or stay, go to the army (if you are male under 60-years old) or stay apart and hide mobilization, to do volunteering and donating or not and so on. An important methodological component of the study is the recognition of ambivalent character in the manifestations of civic responsibility / irresponsibility in Ukraine, particularly under the war. Were the high wave of national consolidation, patriotism and civic responsibility of many Ukrainians, particularly at the first year of large-scale invasion, mostly the "rally round the flag" effect or was this the result of the long dynamics in the sociopolitical process of forming a civic Ukrainian nation? The response is "*yes*" for both interconnected factors.

Methodology and pre-war research

The starting methodological position of my research is treating responsible citizenship as a complex phenomenon which combines at least three aspects: social value/attitude, social practice/behavior, and communicative discourse. The meaning of responsible citizenship is a social and discursive construction, in many ways alike to modern identity. Moreover, as it is in the case of Ukraine, the process of social construction of responsible citizenship goes along with

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[4] Institute of Sociology, NAS Ukraine

the formation of nation-civic self-identification of many people in Ukraine. Responsible citizenship could also be interpreted in two dimensions: vertical (the state-citizens relationship and citizens' loyalty to the state) and horizontal one, which is mostly associated with socially responsible relations between citizens themselves, their mutual solidarity and support. The war has actualized both of these dimensions of responsible citizenship in Ukraine. However, the dynamics of civic activism should also be considered in referring to different stages of the war. In the framework of a sociological approach, I am applying the wide arsenal of sociological research methods, combining theoretical and empirical components of the study. Pre-war research and surveys on responsible citizenship in Ukraine is a useful part of current study. In 2009, I initiated the question(s) "*Do you feel personal responsibility for the situation in the country (in your city/village)?*" which was introduced in the nation-wide sociological surveys by the Institute of Sociology. And one may trace these dynamics in the period from 2009 till 2019 (Table 1).

Table 1. Dynamics of distribution of responses to the question "*Which personal responsibility do you bear for the state of affairs in Ukraine?*" (N=1800, %)

Variants	2009	2013	2015	2017	2018	2019
Full	2,3	1,8	2,9	5,2	3,3	8,1
Partial	21,2	15,8	30,0	28,8	29,9	37,0
F+P (aggreg.)	23,5	17,6	32,9	34,0	33,4	45,6
None	63,0	67,0	55,6	56,8	55,3	46,1
Hard to say	13,5	15,2	10,8	9,0	11,5	8,8

The surveys' results revealed that the level of citizenship responsibility considerably increased after the Revolution of Dignity: from 17,6% in 2013 to about 33% in 2015 (Table 1). Apparently, the people feel more responsibility in the conditions when they have a greater influence on political processes. Another finding was about a greater level of citizens' responsibility at local level rather than for the whole country.

The important methodological premise in studying responsible citizenship is recognition of its link with a person's civic-national self-identification. The latter can be interpreted as a prerequisite of responsible citizenship. In order to be a responsible citizen a person ought at least to recognize and appreciate his/her citizenship as a marker of belonging to a nation-state and its large community. The war became a powerful catalyst of responsible citizenship, but its prerequisite (a civic nation) was mostly the result of the country's pre-war development. There are at least two sociological indicators which demonstrate the formation of a civic nation in Ukraine before the large-scale invasion. These are the dynamics of self-identification of Ukraine's population (responses to the question "*Who do you think you are first of all?*") and the growth of citizens' national pride (responses to the question "*To what extent are you proud or not proud of being a citizen of Ukraine?*"). According to the monitoring surveys conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (IS NASU), the share of respondents whose priority self-identification was "a citizen of Ukraine" increased from 48,4% in 2012 to 64,4% in 2014 (*Figure 1*). A similar dynamic growth was reflected regarding respondents' pride in being a citizen of Ukraine: from 42,6% in 2012 to 66,6% in 2015.

Figure 1. The dynamics of national-civic self-identification (*the data of nation-wide monitoring surveys by Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in "face to face" interviews. The nationwide sample is 1,800 respondents representing the adult (over 18 years) population of the country. From 2014, the sample did not include the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.*

But the highest growth in public attitudes of national-civic self-identification was indicated in the survey of July 2022 after the large-scale invasion. This transformation of Ukrainian society has nourished a broader social foundation and prepared a favorable platform for mobilization, responsible civic activism and resilience in wartime.

Responsible citizenship as a behavioral pattern in wartime Ukraine

An important peculiarity of Ukrainian civic engagement in wartime is that activism has become more connected to a sense of responsible citizenship. The protection of the country, and its unity and integrity within internationally recognized borders, is a common good that cannot belong separately to anyone, but only to all. Zarembo and Martin (2023) further develop this value-laden stance by applying the conceptual frameworks of "sense of community" and "sense of community responsibility" in their analysis of Ukrainian civil society-like activities in wartime. A similar argument is developed by P.Sztompka, who identifies a "bright side" of the war tragedy in the "outbreak of mobilization of responsible citizenship and civil society" (Sztompka 2023). Referring to David Miller's definition of republican citizenship as "being willing to take active steps to defend the rights of the other members of the political community, and more generally to promote its common interests (...) and particularly to be ready to volunteer for public service when the need arises," he argues that Ukrainians have passed this test during the war (Sztompka 2023).

Wartime activism serves as a convincing social and value-oriented manifestation of many people's awareness of their identification with the nation and their belonging to the country. I argue that this transformation of Ukrainian society has nourished a broader social foundation and prepared a favourable platform for civic mobilization, resistance and responsibility as well as for the resilience of civil society itself in wartime. Relevant to this conclusion is the SCORE-inspired Holistic Assessment of Resilience of Population (SHARP), a complex research project that has

already produced two surveys, conducted in Ukraine in 2022-2023. The surveys show that the respondents' attitudes of identity, trust and activism are interconnected and partly reinforce each other in preserving the resilience of Ukrainian society during the war (SHARP, Wave 2, 2023). Additionally, an important point is that boundaries of responsible citizenship attitude and behavior have exceeded the institutional framework of NGOs and become widespread social practice in wartime Ukraine. Thus, civic and community-oriented responsibility is an important aspect of the development of civil society in Ukraine under wartime conditions, and one which creates habits that may well outlast the fighting. It demonstrates the link between the identity of Ukrainians as a civic nation to lived values of social responsibility to defend the nation and the state, and thus lays a strong foundation for a resilient form of civil society activism.

However, given negative socio-economic consequences of the war for most people, one may see that the war has not changed, and perhaps even strengthened, the predominantly paternalistic sentiments of Ukrainian society. This may distort and weaken attitudes of personal responsibility, particularly in helping others and keeping social solidarity interactions and networks which are essential for the society's resilience. According to the monitoring surveys conducted by IS NASU in July 2024, there is still a dominance of a paternalistically-oriented socio-economic model of solidarity in Ukrainian society with people's prevailing expectations for social responsibility rather from the state than from the fellow's citizens (*Fig.2*).

Figure 6.2. "How would you assess who should take responsibility for helping people?" (on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 - people themselves should take more responsibility for helping each other, 10 - the state should take more responsibility for helping people?). *The data of the nation-wide monitoring survey by IS NASU in 2024.*

Discourse on responsibility in wartime Ukraine

The issues of responsibility of various social actors and stakeholders is becoming increasingly relevant and active in public discourse in Ukraine in wartime.

In one spectrum of this discourse ("victorious") many manifestations of civic responsible activism such as heroic deeds at the frontline, social solidarity and help to others, volunteering, donations to the army and support for volunteers are presented and discussed. This discourse also includes the discussion on self-regulation and citizens' responsible behavior, including journalists and bloggers, for not spreading in public the pictures of immediate rocket hits, sensitive info on army location etc.

In the other spectrum of the responsibility discourse the cases and appearances of social irresponsibility (which is described sometimes in terms of "betrayal") are also actively discussed, particularly in social networks. Economic and humanitarian hardship, and the people's mass displacement, often accompanied by permanent psychological stress, social disintegration, fear and anomie are the factors which might weaken civic responsibility. However, the country's institutional deformations also have its own harmful impact. The special and critical focus in these discussions are the cases of misdoings and corruption related to the army supply, humanitarian aid and resources etc.

The complex issues of mobilization and long delayed law on mobilization have added fuel to hot discussion of citizenship responsibility. In this case the law and real practice are diverged. According to the Constitution (art.65), "Defence of the Motherland, of the independence and territorial indivisibility of Ukraine, and respect for its state symbols, are the *duties* of citizens of Ukraine. Citizens perform military service in accordance with the law." However, there is a lot of public criticism regarding social injustice in the current mobilization campaign, its bad organization and management   and the lack of political responsibility in decision-making on mobilization.

The issues of political responsibility of ruling politicians are a special hot spot in the public discourse of responsibility. Hard questions about the authorities' responsibility for a poor preparation of the country for the war, for disruptions in national defense programs, for the rapid occupation of the Southern regions by the aggressor ("why Chongar and other ways from Crimea were not destroyed?"*)*, the cases of top-level corruption etc. are already posed and actively discussed in social networks.

Concluding remarks

The issues of responsibility in its various meanings and aspects, including political ones, will be the central agenda of the next electoral campaign in Ukraine.

Responsible citizens are the principal actor which could be a counter-balance preventing authoritarian risks in post-war development of the country. And studying these issues in the current Ukrainian context is an important research and public task.

Populistic and paternalistic attitudes that could be strengthened during the war may distort and weaken attitudes of personal responsibility which are essential for Ukraine's resilience in the wartime and in the post-war prospects for the country's renovation.

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The Rise of the Global South: A Factor in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Olena Bordilovska[5]

One of the global dimensions of the Russo-Ukrainian War has finally become evident: key non-Western countries began to play a defining role in a changing world order. So, the current position of the so-called Global South needs deep and complex investigation, especially given the Russo-Ukrainian War and its consequences. The war has damaged global food and energy supply chains and made international trade fragile and complicated. The Global South depends on food and fertilizer exports from both Russia and Ukraine. This "distant conflict" has provoked even more complaints and demands from the Global South. Still, Ukraine needs the Global South countries, and not only Western nations, as friends and allies. Diplomatically, the countries commonly associated with the Global South hold 70% of the votes in the United Nations General Assembly. They maintain a neutral position and have relations with both sides, so they can negotiate in the peace process.

Research question: Definition of "Global South" and shaping factors for its attitude toward the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Methodology

The research methodology relies on classical tools of political science. It includes content analysis, which was used to review official documents, along with statements and speeches by the leaders of Global South nations. Also, this method is applicable to the analytical reports made by different think tanks and research institutions that focus on the current state of world affairs and the foreign policy of various nations. Another method used is that of historical analysis, as a common and very effective model for investigating how the past could make an impact on the present and future. In our case, this method is even more important, as it really helps to understand how Russian propaganda manipulates history. Still, we try our best to use proper applications of the insights from history to these kinds of misuses and lies. The next method, that of systems analysis, is a hugely important tool, as it enables us to not only mention the facts, but to make the correct conclusions and provide forecasts. Systems analysis looks at the motivations for long-range decision-making and planning and enables us to avoid mistakes and false steps. Finally, the case study method is aimed at analyzing specific situations in different states with regard to their ambitions and capabilities. An excellent example is the case of India, almost approved non-officially to be a Voice of Global South recently. All together, these methodologies provided us an opportunity to study the situation in international forums and the foreign policy of Global South nations as a whole, taking into account a factor in the Russo-Ukrainian War, which is obviously a trigger of the rising voice of the Global South.

Present Results and Discussion

The definition of the Global South itself lacks a proper understanding of this huge number of nations: The "Global South" is a fluid term, selectively used to describe developing countries in contrast with the developed "Global North" or the West. The term is controversial and can be misleading. First, the Global South is not a formal entity—political, economic, military, or otherwise. These countries have extremely diverse cultures political systems, development

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indicators and political characteristics. The regime types vary, from democratic/free (like Argentina, Brazil, Ghana, and South Africa), to hybrid/semi-free (like Pakistan, Morocco, Kuwait, and Indonesia), and authoritarian/not free (the majority – from Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba in Latin America, to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the Southeast Asia).

So, the name itself lacks the depth and diversity of the world it purports to describe. Also, it sounds a bit outdated: the concept of the Global South as a synonym for the Third World began to gain traction in the 1970s, with the call for a New International Economic Order. But it really rose to prominence with the 1980 Brandt Report. Written by an international commission led by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, the landmark document distinguished between those countries with comparatively higher GDP per capita—which were overwhelmingly concentrated in the Northern Hemisphere—and poorer ones. The majority of the latter group fell south of what became known as the Brandt Line (in fact, the map left much to be desired, since many nations designated as "southern," India among them, lie entirely in the Northern Hemisphere, while "northern" Australia is located below the Equator).

Following the end of the Cold War, the term "Third World" fell gradually out of favor, and the "Global South" offered a more neutral and appealing label. The definition is synonymous with the Group of 77, a collection of postcolonial and developing countries that united in 1964 to jointly advocate for their economic interests. The modern state of world affairs is already featured by the intense competition among different nations for what is called "a more justified world order" — this became a slogan of the Global South. There is a persistent feeling among many non-Western countries that their concerns and problems do not get the attention they deserve.

The consequences of the Russo-Ukrainian War for Global South

The voices of the Global South sound stronger year by year; still, they continue to suffer from different conflicts and competitions. Right now, we are witnessing a growing crisis of the world order, of which the Russo-Ukrainian War is both a symptom and catalyst. The highly interconnected and interdependent nature of the global economy means that not only Europe, but other regions as well are similarly, or even more negatively, affected by the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine. The consequences of the war have already become a huge challenge for many Asian and African countries, and hunger can provoke not only human suffering but further social and economic instability. These negative results of Russian aggression put many Global South nations in a sensitive position and many of them have made appeals for the war's immediate peaceful resolution. Still, there is no clear understanding of how in fact to stop the war and negotiate, as the two sides in this crisis are not equal at all: one is the aggressor, while the another is the victim of the aggression. Just to ask for an immediate stop to the armed conflict makes no sense, and also there is no clear roadmap for Russo-Ukrainian negotiations proposed by Global South nations.

Russian false narratives

The official slogans in the majority of Global South nations are still anti-Western, like "all is best which is against the West." The Russian Federation has fueled this position by different

means (through arms exports, intelligence networks, chambers of commerce, cultural organizations, etc.). Russia (and the Soviet Union, previously) has been a full-spectrum arms exporter to the G77 states, and used to make this position extremely helpful for her strategic goals. At the same time, Russian propaganda became successful as well in many countries of the Global South—by blaming the US, NATO, and the EU for almost everything and providing "justification" for its own aggressive conduct, Russia has managed to convince developing nations that Ukraine is merely "a puppet of imperialist powers." The presence of Russian media, spies, and prepaid "friends" in almost every country of the Global South is a well-known fact. The Russian Federation already declared collaboration with Global South as the priority of its foreign policy and even proposed a new term "Global Majority" for its last possible partners.

Since the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has started to pursue a broader course in international politics, engaging not just with its existing partners but also seeking ties with countries of the Global South. The aim of Ukraine's outreach is to increase global awareness of the nature of Russian aggression and to elevate Ukraine's status as an important player on the world stage among Global South peoples. Ukraine is a trusted economic partner and we insist that people's lives and well-being should not be a part of Russia's blackmail or famine games. Within the Black Sea Grain Initiative (reached in July 2022), Ukraine was able to export 32.8 million tons of food to countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe in a year. The agreement created a protected sea transit corridor and was designed to alleviate global food shortages by allowing exports to resume from three ports in Ukraine, which is a major producer of grains and oilseeds. Ukraine, even while at war, is still among the top 10 food exporters of the world. At the same time, we have to deal with Global South nations carefully, show them all respect, have right expectations, and not push them to change their positions of neutrality. It is important to say that, for many in the Global South, Ukraine's strong resistance against an aggressive Russia became a sort of miracle. The bravery of the Ukrainian people is highly esteemed. Some crucial points to be delivered: Ukraine *never* wanted this war and never planned it; Ukraine never attacked any country, and there is no threat from Ukraine to anyone; Ukraine is struggling to fend for itself, not for NATO, the US, or the EU. For us, it is really a war for independence: we cannot stop fighting, since otherwise there will be no Ukraine. That is why, at the G-20 summit in Bali in 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy presented a "peace formula" to overcome the Russian threat, and this 10-point plan remains the only way to restore justice and peace for Ukraine. If Ukraine wins, international law will be restored as well, we believe. Moreover, the support of the Global South countries is important for implementing President Zelenskyy's initiative.

Could the nations of the Global South speak with one voice and, if so, how and where would they represent their position?

Role of India: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has declared that "lending a voice to the priorities of the Global South" is a central objective of India's G20 chairmanship. It was India's policy mantras of multilateralism, multipolarity, and the "middle way" that won the day at the venue of the 2023 G20 summit in New Delhi, when leaders finally agreed to sign the New Delhi Declaration. The Russo-Ukrainian War became the central issue of discussions during all G20 meetings in India that year. The outcomes of the meeting were controversial. On the one hand, many participants called the meeting a success, but on the other hand, it may have been an attempt to pass off wishful thinking as reality. Actually, Indian diplomacy had been saved by the West at New Delhi summit from September 9–10, when allowing for the compromise on Ukraine in the New Delhi Declaration.

For India, the G20 process has been one of rediscovering its potential as a responsible global stakeholder. For the world at large, this process has been about coming to terms with the center of gravity shifting toward the developing world. The challenges of sustainable development, inclusive growth, climate change, food security, the digital divide, emerging tech regulation, and multilateral development bank reform cannot be undertaken without the Global South at the table. The inclusion of the African Union in the G20 has fundamentally altered the character of the platform, making it more inclusive and representative of the emerging global order.

Has China lost his leadership in the Global South? Not really, China still holds a very strong position in different formats and continues to provide different projects in the countries of the Global South. In this regard, it is important to say a few words about BRICS's enlargement at the 2023 Summit in Johannesburg — the 15th such gathering of the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The group has continuously insisted on the need to reform global governance structures to reflect the new reality of the emergence of major economies outside the North Atlantic. In fact, the decision to invite the Argentinean Republic, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to become full members of BRICS has been agreed to by China. Also, the Johannesburg Declaration stated that the Russo-Ukrainian War is a trigger of the rise of the Global South in international relations. Just as 10 years ago one could hear talk everywhere about the rise of China, today one cannot help but hear about the rise of the Global South. China's presence has grown so strong in these countries that the US has recognized it as a key geopolitical rival. The Global South is next. So, it is the war in Ukraine which became a main shaping factor of Global South nations' coming back to the world stage, with all their demands and appeals.

Conclusion

The Russo-Ukrainian War is a chance to change the rules of the game. The peculiarity of the current historical moment is that, within the crisis in the global security architecture, many countries in the Global South have begun to play their own game, guided by pragmatic interests. The national interests of individual countries make Russia's defeat in this war unacceptable to them, with all sincere sympathy for the Ukrainians. The main reason is that Russia itself has made a lot of anti-Western appeals and appointed itself as a leader of "the rest of the World" or Global majority." At the same time, nations of the Global South try to preserve some crucial relationships with the Western states, despite all the rhetoric. The reality is that the West now needs the Global South, while the Global South itself still needs the West as well, for many reasons. Ukraine needs the Global South too, from other side, we have to ensure the interests and needs of the Global South in Ukraine, with a fair explanation and estimation of the Russo-Ukrainian War. The restoration of a logical chain of events is required, and the position of two states has to be clarified. It is not possible to have a victim and an aggressor on the same side. We need a long-lasting peace and restoration of justice. An independent, sovereign, democratic, and strong Ukraine and its security are vital for the stability of the whole world—this is what we have to tell nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Ukraine needs friends and partners everywhere, not just in the West.

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The Impact of the Socio-Political Environment on Ukrainian Art After the 24th of February 2022

Iryna Baltaziuk[6]

The impetus for my research was the date of the 24th of February, which marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of Ukraine. Art has become an important link in the struggle for independence and is therefore important. There is no doubt that Russia's war against Ukraine is a war against culture, language, traditions and identity. The invader's desire to deny the existence of Ukrainian culture forced it to take up arms. Thus, all Ukrainian art became a political statement. My work is aimed at compiling an archive of artistic expressions created during the war, with a special focus on art after the 24th of February 2022. I rely on such sources of documentation as:

- United platform of culture and media during the war and Multimedia library "Ukraine war art collection", projects initiated by the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine.
- "Art of Victory", a portal that archives contemporary military murals, posters, illustrations, caricatures and memes. The project was initiated by the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation.
- The Wartime Art Archive, initiated by the NGO Museum of Contemporary Art.
- Past / Future / Art – a memory culture platform.
- "Post Impreza" – a project documenting the war by the Lviv Centre for Urban History, which focuses on the local artistic and cultural life of Ivano-Frankivsk and the region.
- antiwarcoaltion.art – the international coalition of cultural workers in solidarity with Ukraine.
- "War. Stories from Ukraine" – platform that collect, record and narrate people's stories during the full-scale war which Russia has started against Ukraine.

Research question

The war caused significant changes in Ukrainian art. While it made it impossible to return to the pre-war level of activity, it also became a catalyst for the development of new Ukrainian art aimed at rebirth and strengthening of identity. To a certain extent, it has become many times more numerous, because we cannot ignore such manifestations of creativity as posters, memes, illustrations, as they are also part of the Ukrainian cultural front. The study of the influence of the socio-political environment on Ukrainian art requires the use of methods of documentation and work with the material as an archive. The main goal of my work is to explain complex processes and phenomena through symbols in art, especially as intercultural communication in the struggle for common European and global values, rights and freedoms. The relevance of research is based

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on the use of an artistic symbol as a marker to define such important elements of society as diversity, identity, nation-building processes, migration, democracy society, and social issues. I set myself the goal of studying art that contribute to nation-building processes, doing it in the field research. I spent almost two years in Ukraine documenting these processes, compiling an archive of works by Ukrainian artists created during the war, and developing tools for its analysis. Much of my work was given to the state media library of Ukrainian art created during the war, developed by the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine. This is one of the few archives that works on the principle of a library.

Methodology

Analyzing the impact of the socio-political environment on Ukrainian art requires an interdisciplinary approach. This has led to the use of historical, historical-cultural, cultural studies and art history methods of analysis, with special attention to such sciences and disciplines as sociology, political science, philosophy, psychology, cultural studies and history, which expand the field of interpretation of symbols in art. The methodology of the study is a comparative analysis of the works of artists in which archaic, cross-cultural and national symbols are clearly expressed. Focusing on the author's approach, I analyse the artistic symbol and its sense-organizing factors – context, concept, communication, memory (historical and genetic), time and the "effect of visibility".
My factual material consists of more than 200 artists and more than 500 works created during the war. I identify the main symbols that contribute to a better understanding of complex socio-political processes and contribute to the education of society, giving a sense of involvement in important changes in society. I include in my research the main forms of visual and spatial art, such as painting, graphics, sculpture, installation, performance, etc., and analyze the works based on the methods and principles outlined in my thesis.

Results and discussion

In just one year, we have moved from individual to collective thinking, when a single statement speaks for millions, and when millions are reflected in each individual voice. The idea of the unbreakable nature of the Ukrainian people has become the core of most artists' works. The most impressive exhibit is a historical installation created due to people's desire to preserve cultural heritage. The monument is made of sandbags, which hides the object of national importance by covering it with layers of protective material, it has no cultural value in itself. However, having become a symbol of culture during the war, the monument has become an art object in the public space of a European country, while in Ukraine it is a necessary condition for survival, especially for cultural objects. The installation "Piazza Ucraina" as a collective manifesto built in front of the Ukrainian pavilion on the 59th Venice Biennale in 2022, has taken the form of the most impressive art object of the early 21st century (La Biennale di Venezia, 2022). The historical installation resonated in other countries as well. For example, at the Eurovision Song Contest in Liverpool in 2023.

The installation "Piazza Ucraina". Photo Il Gazzettino (afisha.it)

War is a complex socio-political phenomenon that causes irreversible changes in all spheres of human life. It resonated in art. Mykyta Kadan's project with outspoken slogans protesting against the war, created for the entrance to the Vienna Secession, became a resonant one. Works from the "Repeated Speech" series, such as "Close the Sky", "Stop Putin", "Fuck War", "Cheap Gas, Cheap Blood", and more, which were actively used during the protests against the Russian invasion, endlessly reproduce political language in art. One of the reasons for the emergence of such works is the desire to keep Ukraine in the centre of the information field, appealing to culture as one of the most important elements of the country's national security. For example, Ukrainian artist Zhanna Kadyrova created the "Russian Rocket 2022" project. These are stickers in the shape of a rocket that the artist places in the public transport of European countries.

To mark Ukraine's Independence Day in 2022, sculptor Mykyta Zigura created an 80-metre-long shadow of the world's largest aircraft, the Ukrainian "Mriya", depicted in a wheat field in Denmark, which can be seen even from the space. To mark the second anniversary of the war in Ukraine, he created a new project called "Drone Attack". In the middle of a peaceful promenade in France, he placed the shadows of Shahed drones. However, most people continue their walk along the coast, unaware of the threat. After all, thousands of kilometres away from the war, the same symbols will be perceived differently.

Artists who work with the Ukrainian context abroad are currently facing the fact that not everyone is ready to show the war as it is, because the audience is not ready for it. We have examples where already planned exhibitions are cancelled or expositions are removed. This led to the fact that artists also learned to speak through the metaphor of the mute. To be heard, they create deep silent and solitude statements: Maria Matiashova's 10-hour-long performance about the fatigue and the lives of refugees; Maria Proshkowska's 5-hour-long performance "Farina" about the fate of Ukrainian grain; Kharkiv artist Polina Kuznetsova's silent performance in a cage on Freedom Square in Tallinn, which refers to life under occupation, forced migration and refugees.

Today, we are witnessing the political function of art coming to the fore, reflecting important processes in society. Despite the opinion that art is mostly outside politics, we see the opposite. Art not only has the right to exist but has also become an important component of national security. It contributes to the fight against Russian propaganda, strengthens Ukrainian culture and national identity, shapes the country's image in the international scene, and forms the basis of Ukrainian self-identification through a sense of proud belonging to the nation.

The fact that 70-80% of cultural figures have remained in the country has forced international foundations and organizations to refocus on helping Ukrainian culture in the domestic market (Vox Ukraine, 2022). An impressive list of institutions that support the arts during the war includes government institutional support for Ukrainian art such as Ukrainian Cultural Foundation, Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, Ukrainian Institute and more, public initiatives, and international support such as Creative Europe, Artist at Risk, PEN America's Artists at Risk Connection project and more. Expenditures on culture in the State Budget of Ukraine for 2024 have increased, contrary to expectations, indicating, among other things, that culture is important and related to national security. In addition to state funding, "we receive funds for the social sphere, medicine, and culture as grants or long-term loans from our partners", – the official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine states (The Parliament of Ukraine, 2023).

In this context, it is worth mentioning art as a weapon in the search for historical justice. It is about identifying world-famous Ukrainian artists and their paintings, which have long been classified as Russian in international museums. In some museums, such as the National Gallery in London, it took a month to rename Degas's Russian Dancers to Ukrainian Dancers (The National Gallery, London). In others, like the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam, it took a year to finally call Kazymyr Malevych a Ukrainian. Or even two years, as in the Ateneum, Finland's largest art museum, which recognized Ilya Repin as a Ukrainian artist a few months ago.

It is important to note that this is not always a quick way, but cultural diplomacy plays an extremely important role here. Off the battlefield, the Ukrainian community is fighting the enemy with the same unity, and art has become the most powerful weapon on this path.

Degas's Ukrainian Dancers. The National Gallery, London.

Conclusion

The compilation of an archive plays a key role in the process of documenting the war, as new artistic manifestations appear every day that require the attention of researchers. This process is extremely important, because without it we will not be able to evaluate this period in the history of Ukraine and its impact on art.

One of my conclusions, based on the collected f material, is that the existing signs in the content, form and style of expression of the artistic symbol indicate a strengthening of the public position, a sense of belonging to the nation and interest in the life of the country. Even looking at the work of individual artists, we can see that their statements are formed into a collective message that takes the form of a strong voice about the war in Ukraine.

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The Cognitive Warfare Challenge for Media Standards of War Coverage in Ukraine

Yuriy Zaliznyak[7]

Cognitive warfare can be defined as "an unconventional form of warfare that uses cyber tools to alter enemy cognitive processes, exploit mental biases or reflexive thinking, and provoke thought distortions, influence decision-making and hinder actions, with negative effects, both at the individual and collective levels" (Claverie and du Cluzel 2022). Other scholars consider it the weaponization of public opinion by an external entity, on the one hand, to influence public and governmental policy and, on the other, to destabilize public institutions (Bernal et al. 2020, p. 10).

As a relatively recent development, cognitive warfare has emerged from prior related non-kinetic forms of warfare, such as psychological operations, or information warfare. It has been visibly strengthened by the rise of digital means of communication, social media, and artificial intelligence. These instruments have helped cognitive warfare to reach human minds efficiently in a short period of time and turn it into an actual battlefield with a totalitarian state, terrorist group, or transnational organization led by an expansionist idea, religious belief system, or material interests. The primary aim of such cognitive warfare is to change not only what people think, but how they think and act regarding the goal of the aggressor.

Cognitive warfare is more complicated than just fake news, disinformation, and manipulating private data and public opinion. It is similar, for example, to the Cambridge Analytica case (Harbath and Fernekes 2023) when digital consultants to the Trump campaign used data improperly obtained from Facebook to build voter profiles in 2016. In cases of cognitive warfare, the individual affected by fake or malicious information still has the potential to trace the whole infection process, but the cognitive warfare's prey tend to consider their thoughts, emotions, and actions as something natural, rational, and based on an independent intellectual and emotional basis. Such a way of thinking serves as the best proof that cognitive warfare is being waged successfully against a person and some part of the society they represent, shaping and influencing individual and group beliefs and behaviors to favor the aggressor's tactical or strategic objectives.

Faced with an actual war, such as that waged by the Russian Federation—in a full-scale form against Ukraine, and in some latent forms—against the collective West in general, NATO officials seem to be completely aware of the danger coming from cognitive warfare as a form of unconventional warfare. One of the biggest fears here is that, in its extreme form, it has the potential to fracture and fragment an entire society, political union, or military bloc even without any direct use of physical force, influencing its members in such a way that they no longer have the collective will to resist an adversary's intentions (Johns Hopkins University and Imperial College London 2021). This danger is not necessarily connected to military components only, and may be exploited in other, civil areas of public activities and social interactions—especially, with regards to mass media's role in social and strategic communications.

Therefore, local, national, regional, and global media outlets and other disseminators of information are more than interesting targets for the initiators of cognitive warfare. The access these media have to the information consumption menu of their audiences, and the trust these audiences' representatives feel in regards to these media, tend to be the key instruments or pathways for cognitive warfare. Naturally, all respected newsrooms and editors are already protected with professional standards, ethical principles of journalism, and editorial guidelines

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from any external interference or internal malfunctions (BBC 2023; Reuters Trust 2006). But what if all these barriers are not working any more as complete insurance for a profession under attack from cognitive warfare actors in the same way they attack the common sense and thinking of individuals?

Research question

This paper is based on the hypothesis that modern media outlets are objects of cognitive warfare in the similar way to separate individuals. What if the media, in the face of cognitive warfare, are vulnerable in the same way as any other members of society? What if media standards and newsroom procedures can be compared to individual and social cognition of reality, and facts as the building blocks of further decision-making—in particular, if, due to well-known professional standards and common news procedures of agenda-setting and information verification, the actual aggressor knows the way of journalists' thinking and the algorithms of their decision-making to the same extent as they know core principles of individual and mass psychology and ethical norms that serve to bring society together? Members of the media industry are also a part of the general public and are mutually affecting each other, despite their professional background or profound training.

Methodology

The key methods of this paper are methods of formal logic, analogies and parallels, as well as rhetorical analysis (Lunsford, Ruszkiewicz and Walters 2022). In other words, I consider whether media industry representatives' arguments are persuasive or not in terms of justifying their newsrooms' invulnerability or low vulnerability to the challenges of cognitive warfare.

As a starting point, I take into consideration the fact that there might be an obvious difference between the institutional readiness of the media community and that of society at large to resist the malign influence of cognitive warfare initiators. At a minimum, the representatives of respected media outlets and newsrooms tend to imagine themselves as professionals armed with outstanding critical thinking and solid knowledge about all possible threats in order to disarm them or repel any sophisticated attack.

Therefore, using formal logic and methods of analogy, I intend to draw a parallel between how cognitive warfare can affect an individual and the whole society, which includes journalists and media as separate institutions through which the instigators of cognitive warfare can increase their influence on society.

Discussion

The key target in cognitive warfare is public opinion in its interaction with state power, local authorities, and the army as a part of society. At the same time, in order to be efficient in its influence on all these parties, cognitive warfare needs to be able to slip through some pre-existing "cracks" in the target society: some political, social, racial, religious or other tensions to exploit (Miller 2023). The amplification of these tensions in the pursuit of further destabilizing effects is conducted through local and foreign media using poor journalism, rumors, propaganda, disinformation, and conspiracy theories adopted for the target society, taking into consideration its specific features. The key point here is to let the media representatives believe that all stories they

tell their audience and all questions they address to officials are coming from their own knowledge and understanding of the situation—without any external interference or deformation and under the protection of their professional standards, ethical norms, and sincere belief in promoting the public good.

Naturally, this mixture of good knowledge of the social context and profound understanding of media industry principles at least partially shapes the configuration of cognitive warfare and its chances of success. Of course, there are other components of effective influence, including feasible strategic goals, thoughtful engagement in the tactics of any operation, and competent professionals to implement the plan. And their competence has to be at least one level higher in comparison to that of the editors and reporters of the chosen media landscape.

The Russian full-scale war against Ukraine also marked the climax of previously latent forms of aggression through political, economic, cultural, and informational means. On the one hand, the invasion of February 2022 highlighted the low effectiveness of all "soft power" measures used by Moscow to subdue Kyiv—before 2014 and even after the annexation of Crimea. On the other hand, the ensuing resistance of the Ukrainian people and the failure of the Russian attempt at blitzkrieg brought the aggressor to the point when the common kinetic force had to be accompanied and strengthened by more sophisticated informational, physiological, and other components. And the media landscape—not only in Ukraine and Russia, but worldwide—has become a new battlefield.

In comparison to the peaceful life of reporting, modern principles of war coverage are guided by pretty much the same fundamental rules of information verification. But in the end, the responsibility for believing in emotional stories from the frontlines with close ties to the target audience becomes the burden of the same audience. For example, some media outlets, like Reuters or Meduza, are inserting a special disclaimer into their reporting about certain doubts regarding the actual ability of the newsroom or its correspondents to conduct independent verification or fact-checking of the information from the "both sides". I consider this approach as a conscious display of a newsroom's doubts regarding its ability to provide storytelling free of bias, propaganda, disinformation, and other tools of cognitive warfare. Even if the reporters' competence to report about various wars and armed conflicts has been proven in the past, it does not mean that they are perfectly fit to provide a completely clear and objective story of this war.

For instance, a foreign minister is a legitimate newsmaker: his or her quoted pronouncement is solid material for reporting according to editorial guidelines. But by amplifying it to the public, the media may let him or her spread propaganda, deny reality, or introduce some "alternative facts." As a reporter, should I just quote his statements, or should I balance it with opinion from the other side of the story? With whom should I start, then? What source must be mentioned first in the title of the article, since people do not necessarily read the whole news story? Or, maybe, I need some expert to give their opinion and some background? What if in the story there are not only two sides, but three or four, and it is hard to find an appropriate expert in this field?

Presumably, before going to the war zone as a media representative, the reporter must understand the full complexity of the conflict: its historical background, the motives of all main parties involved, the viability of their arguments and the possible consequences of various war ends. It also takes some time to get prepared and be ready to reconsider every story under the pressure of time shortages and situations that may change rapidly.

All stories before reaching the newsroom and the audience after that, are supposed to go through specific screening guidelines: from the perspective of professional standards, ethical

principles, and norms. But the trick here is that this screening framework is well known not only to media workers, but also to cognitive warfare instigators. This leads to the assumption of double vulnerability on the part of the field reporters and the editors in the newsrooms. The constant chase for "new news" provokes the rapid change of agenda in the newsroom, and fragmentation of the information process in consumers' minds. In other words, they are getting separate pieces of the bigger story in its complexity because the media have no time to stick to one war story if another, newer war appears on the horizon—in Syria, Yemen, Ukraine, Gaza, Syria once again, and so on.

At the same time, common people who work in the field, in the newsroom, or on the verification team are under the influence of individual worldviews, beliefs, and predispositions that may collide with the professional standards or even objective reality. Simultaneously, they may also become a target audience for cognitive warfare instigators, who know their standards, workflow, and pains connected to the lack of time and need to compete simultaneously with other media outlets on the market.

Some journalists and editors may have some suspicions about this, but, seeing no obvious way to solve the problem, they just refer to the standard procedures and follow the protocol in order to survive and let things go. The source of this vulnerability is the set of professional standards being, at its core, a "universal excuse" or the "escape path from responsibility." The exploitation of this set of standards leads to turning the media into an accomplice of either side of the armed conflict – in terms of one particular story or more. Figuratively speaking, the principle of information Darwinism (Jeong 2013) may kill any good war story if the newsroom, the reporter, and producers are always ready to switch to some alternative news, which is considered to be more important at the moment, or more fresh or visually appealing to the audience. This is especially the case if the audience is already tired of, bored with, or even traumatized by the previous war narratives.

In the case of the media landscape in Ukraine during the war, there was some obvious monopolization of the market by the national news telethon—joint broadcast of several tv-channels under the state control, widely criticized—even by the American partners (US Department of State 2024). Simultaneously, the Ukrainian audience noticed that the standard of wartime news delivery through official media has changed in comparison to the times of peaceful pluralism. Instead of the telethon, it is Telegram that has become one of the most popular sources of information in the country (USAID-Internews 2023). But the problem here is that social media is another path that gives cognitive warfare almost direct access to people's minds. And if Russia did not manage to ruin Ukrainian independence by achieving a quick victory in a short war, it may turn to the tactics of a slower defeat of the opponent by exploiting its internal weaknesses and media through the instruments of cognitive warfare.

Conclusion

The professional standards of contemporary media are well known and, therefore, could be manipulated. If one knows what kind of stories the media are interested in, their internal fact-checking processes, protocols, and what kind of information they may consider admissible, then one can possibly adjust the facts in a deliberate way and let the media discover everything for itself. Since, in a rapidly changing agenda, professional standards are sometimes used as an ultimate excuse, the fear of becoming a spreader of propaganda may force the media to produce even more propagandistic content—by the strict, up to tunnel vision following the good-old protocols and procedures that have been already hacked by the enemy and compromised.

Since the media industry and professional newsrooms consist of the human beings who are part of a broader society with its own weaknesses, the belief in these journalists' and editors' invulnerability to cognitive warfare seems to be inconsistent.

The weaponization of reporting standards by cognitive warfare actors may seem to become a win-win-win case: the media remains devoted to its professional principles, the audience loses no trust in reliable and consistent media, and, therefore, both parties are off the cognitive warfare hook.

Information warfare as a part of cognitive warfare being fought through the media might be called informational cryptoterrorism on the opponent's territory, due to the openness of the information space and online penetration. If one can overcome the opponent without using any military force, it is the best path to victory. No direct confrontation with the foe's army is needed if one can use unconventional, latent influence on domestic and international public opinion, common people, certain elite's representatives.

A possible adequate response here is to consider professional standards in journalism and contemporary war reporting as not simply a universal shield from disinformation and manipulation, but also as a sword in the opponent's hand—one capable of malicious implications for the media worker, the news outlet, the profession in general, and the public good.

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Human and Material Dimensions of Losses of Ukrainian Science in Russia's War Against Ukraine

Igor Lyman[8]

When we talk about the Russian-Ukrainian war through the lens of science, the problem of human and material losses of Ukrainian science seems to be at the surface. At the same time, the issue is extremely deep, complex and painful, in addition to having a personal dimension for every Ukrainian researcher. Personally I, whose hometown and university were already occupied by the third day of the full-scale invasion, have been involved in a number of initiatives concerning human and material losses of Ukrainian science during the two years of my stay in the status of an internally displaced person. Progress and results of the most significant of these initiatives form the basis of this paper.

The research question of the paper: How scholars researched various aspects of human and material losses of Ukrainian science and worked on reducing their negative impacts in frames of the initiative Ukrainian Science Diaspora, projects Science at Risk Kunsht, ENEFEDU and ENEFEDU2.0.

The work *methodology* is based on the selection for coverage and analysis of those programs and initiatives, aimed at research of human and material dimensions of losses, in which the author was or has been involved personally, which allows considering the relevant problems from the point of view of a direct participant in the processes.

Present results

The human dimension of losses of Ukrainian science differ for conventional three key categories:

1) Scholars who have to leave Ukraine and are abroad;

2) Scholars who left the occupied territories and stay in Ukraine; and

3) Scholars who remained at home in Ukraine and whose universities and scientific institutions were not relocated.

At the same time, the problems of representatives of the third group are not homogeneous either, considering the geographical factor: the challenges of scholars of Zaporizhzhia, situated on the distance of about 30 km from the front line, and scholars of Chernivtsi have fundamental differences.

To speak about the first group, the Russian war in Ukraine forced Ukrainian scientists to leave the country. Many universities and research institutions around the world have kindly helped and hosted many of them. This is a great support, as well as a manifestation of solidarity with the Ukrainian people. An initial estimate by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine showed that more than 5,000 scientists abroad left Ukraine after the invasion. These people are scattered all over the world, but it is essential to maintain contact with them and not lose it for the further reconstruction and development of Ukraine.

That's why the Scholar Support Office at the Council of Young Scientists at the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine has launched the "Ukrainian Science Diaspora" initiative, where Igor Lyman and Yevheniia Polishchuk are founders. The aim of the initiative is to unite the efforts

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of Ukrainian scientists abroad of different waves of migration for further joint research projects, develop tools for their support programs, and their return to Ukraine.

According to its concept, "Ukrainian Science Diaspora" initiative should contribute to: strengthening of the cohesion of Ukrainians abroad for the implementation of ideas related to post-war reconstruction through science; improving of the image of Ukrainian science in the world; establishing of effective networking in various fields of science both within the Ukrainian scientific diaspora and between its representatives and scientists in Ukraine; institutional cooperation between Ukrainian and foreign universities and research institutions; initiation of mentoring by those representatives of the Ukrainian scientific diaspora who have been living abroad for a long time; increasing of the representation of the scientific activity of community members; initiation and implementation of charity projects (Polishchuk 2023).

The initiative is carried out on the basis of the methodological tools of the International Organization for Migration, which is part of the United Nations.

The main aspects of the initiative:

●Building community of the Ukrainian scientists abroad for further cooperation with those scholars who stay in Ukraine and participation in rebuilding projects;

●Mentorship Programs;

●Science Diplomacy; and

●Searching rebuilding projects in Ukraine where Ukrainian scientists' in diaspora expertise will be helpful. Since October, 2023 the web platform, "Ukrainian Science Diaspora" is fully functioning.[9]

Some intermediate results of the initiative in numbers today look like this:

●15 Ukrainian scholars' communities from 12 countries of Europe and America are represented on "Network" (Poland, France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Portugal, Brazil, Sweden, Finland, Spain, Switzerland);

●200 scholars in Europe, Asia, Australia, North and South America are represented at the map of scholars;

●950 participants in telegram chat Ukrainian Science Diaspora (informal);

●More than 400 participants registered for the public presentation of the web-platform;

●More than 6900 site views at the day of presentation of the web platform "Ukrainian Science Diaspora."

The nearest plans of the initiative in Ukraine include the facilitating of new partnerships between host and home universities; development of recommendations of Ukrainian Science Diaspora for home universities; signing memorandums of understanding between the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine and Ukrainian diasporas from different countries. The nearest plans outside Ukraine provide consultations on sustainable development of the diaspora scientific communities with the International Science Council (Brussels), ALLEA, IOM, and UNESCO; fundraising for Ukrainian scientific communities abroad; development of science diplomacy.

Surely, emigration is just one aspect of the human dimension of losses of Ukrainian science. In particular, we cannot forget about the more painful consequence of Russian aggression: Ukrainian scholars who were killed, kidnapped or arrested by the Russians. Besides, 1518 Ukrainian scientists have volunteered for combat duty. This figure appears in "Analysis of war damage to the Ukrainian science sector and its consequences" which recently was commissioned from the Junior Academy of Sciences of Ukraine by UNESCO (Analysis 2024). Working on these

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[9] https://ukrdiaspora.nauka.gov.ua/en/

analyses, the Junior Academy of Sciences of Ukraine collaborated with "Science at Risk" project of Kunsht[10], and both paid attention to human and material losses of Ukrainian science. I communicated between the project coordinators and the compilers of the UNESCO report during the selection of the photos of damaged research infrastructure and the processing of appropriate permissions for their use.

Within the framework of the Science at Risk project, in 2022 a working group was formed with the task of researching the issue of collecting information on damage and destruction of research infrastructure during the war, and based on the in-depth study of individual cases, systematizing data on damaged and destroyed research infrastructure in Ukraine. To create a table of damaged and destroyed research infrastructure, the working group conducted a survey via Google Forms of eight institutions in December, 2022. To supplement and refine this information, in January of 2023, the group members conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with the directors or authorized representatives of the selected institutions. The results of the study were reflected in the White Paper "Forming a Database of Damaged and Destroyed Research Infrastructure in Ukraine" (Furiv, 2023).

In April 2023, the second stage of the Science at Risk project started. The working group, responsible for interviewing about damaged and destroyed research infrastructure in Ukraine, was minimized for two persons (Igor Lyman and Maria Moskovko). Till November 2023 we conducted interviews with representatives of 32 educational and scientific institutions. The White Paper, "Systematising the Practises and Recommendations of Ukrainian Institutions with Damaged and Destroyed Research Infrastructure: Methods of Calculations of Losses, Recovery Needs, Fundraising, and Feedback on Data Collection" was published (Lyman 2023).

Speaking about the material dimension of losses, as of January 2023, because of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, about 110 scientific institutions and higher educational institutions (HEIs) were damaged. Additionally, about 28 scientific institutions and HEIs could not determine the extent of the damage due to the fact that they were shelled, mined, or located in the occupied territory. In November 2023, the real-time mapping of damages conducted by the Junior Academy of Sciences of Ukraine revealed that 168 institutions suffered damages.

At the moment, the losses are more significant: we are working with several ministries and the National Academy of Science of Ukraine to track them. By a joint order of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine dated April 27, 2023, an interdepartmental working group was formed to prepare a report on the damage caused to the science sector in Ukraine as a result of Russian aggression. I was involved in the activities of the interdepartmental working group as a representative of the "Science at Risk" project of Kunsht. This group collected and summarized information regarding damages (destruction) of the research and innovation infrastructure of scientific institutions, higher education institutions that are subordinate to the central bodies of executive power, the National and branch academies of sciences.

As the Russian aggression drags on, just waiting for the victorious end of the war is not constructive; at the same time, it is not enough to be limited only to the accounting of losses. The illustrative cases, when Ukrainian scientists are already organizing the preparation, including practical training, of personnel for the high-quality reconstruction of the Ukrainian research infrastructure, and are already modernizing damaged educational institutions, are the projects "Energy efficient educational institutions. Thermal modernization of VET institutions in the

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[10] https://scienceatrisk.org/

framework of developed energy efficiency courses" (ENEFEDU) and ENEFEDU2.0, which were realized by charitable organization "Charity Fund "Human" with the support of GIZ in 2022-2024.

The main purpose of both projects is to improve the preconditions for improving energy efficiency in Ukraine by raising the awareness of VET students in the issues of thermal modernization of buildings. So, the relevance of the projects is obvious: Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine has already destroyed many cities, towns and villages, and tens of thousands of facilities across the country. The critical need to develop large-scale comprehensive programs for the revival of settlements, restoration of destroyed and damaged infrastructure of Ukraine is already clear. The emphasis will be not only on the restoration of the old housing stock, but on its modernization. Therefore, the implementation of these programs will require a large number of specialists who are well versed in energy efficiency, including thermal modernization of buildings. So, an exceptional role will be given to the specialists graduated from the VET institutions.

That's why in frames of both projects Ukrainian Universities' researchers organized courses (including "Energy efficient windows and doors", "Facade insulation", "Flat roofs") for VET students; wrote and published several textbooks about energy efficiency; organized students' communication with the best practicing specialists in the field of thermal modernization. Importantly, thermal modernization of buildings of 15 VET institutions and one damaged University has been carried out by students, who participated in the project.

Conclusion

The initiative and projects discussed in this paper focused on the problems of the Ukrainian scientific diaspora and the "brain drain" from Ukraine; formation of a database of damaged and destroyed research infrastructure of the country; determining the amount of damage and needs for the restoration of the Ukrainian research infrastructure during the war; training of specialists for infrastructure restoration. These initiatives and projects are just a few of those dealing with human and material losses of Ukrainian science.

Despite the importance of all these initiatives and projects, in general, there is every reason to state that if we talk about the human and material dimensions of the losses of Ukrainian science from the Russian aggression against Ukraine, today there are much more challenges and questions than answers and "recipes."

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